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I
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN DENYING MR. WENGREEN'S MOTION TO
COMPEL DISCOVERY OF THE PROSECUTRIX'S MENTAL HEALTH
RECORDS
A.

"ELEMENT OF HIS DEFENSE"
Regarding the "element of his defense" prong under Utah Rule of Evidence 506,

the State argues that Mr. Wengreen has not met the standards spelled out in State v.
Gonzalez, 2005 UT 72. With due respect to the State, Gonzalez does not quite stand for
what the State says it does. The State's position on Gonzalez is that that case provides a
great bit of clarity on what "element of his defense" means. But that is not so. In the
portion of Gonzalez relied on chiefly by the State here, the Utah Supreme Court denied
Gonzalez's request to review the alleged victim's mental health records primarily
because defense counsel had obtained those recordsfraudulently- and not necessarily
because Gonzalez had failed to satisfy the "element of his defense" language.
Gonzalez is a lengthy opinion; it is 76 paragraphs. The State, in its responsive
brief, relies chiefly on but four paragraphs in the opinion. Those paragraphs are quoted
here in full:
% 42 Next, Mr. Gonzales argues that he was entitled to review
Jessicafs mental health records because her mental health is an
element or claim of his defense. Utah Rule of Evidence 506, which
defines a privilege between a patient and a mental health therapist,
excludes communications that concern a patient's condition where
the condition is "an element of any claim or defense." This is the
same wording that is found on the UNI form that Mr. Montgomery
filled out. Mr. Gonzales argues that Jessica's mental health was an
element of a claim or defense in the lawsuit, and therefore his
s

request for the records was proper.
1f 43 Mr. Gonzales's argument is flawed in two ways. First, his
defense is simply "I didn't do it." He wishes to use Jessica's mental
health records to impeach her credibility as a witness-part of his
defense strategy, but not actually an element of his defense. Second,
regardless of whether Jessica's mental health is an "element" of Mr.
Gonzales's defense, it is the process by which the records were
obtained, not the status of the records as privileged or unprivileged,
that prevents Mr. Gonzales from reviewing them. Even if it were
true that the records were an element of the defense, or were never
privileged in the first place, Mr. Gonzales would still be obligated to
obtain them using the proper avenue.
Tf 44 Mr. Montgomery used a flawed subpoena process to obtain
privileged records. His authority to examine those records, however
obtained, depended on approval of the trial court following an in
camera review. Drawing on a United States Supreme Court case,
Pennsylvania v. Ritchie, 480 U.S. 39, 107 S.Ct. 989, 94 L.Ed.2d 40
(1987), we made this clear in State v. Cardall, 1999 UT 51, 982 P.2d
79. We stated: In Ritchie, the Supreme Court held that where an
exception to privilege allows a defendant access to otherwise
confidential records, the defendant does not have the right to
examine all of the confidential information or to search through state
files without supervision. However, if a defendant can show with
reasonable certainty that exculpatory evidence exists which would
be favorable to his defense, Ritchie gives him the right to have the
otherwise confidential records reviewed by the trial court to
determine if they contain material evidence.
[WJhere "a defendant is aware of specific information contained in
the file ..., he is free to request it directly from the court, and argue in
favor of its materiality." Cardall, 1999 UT 51 atfflf30, 32, 982 P.2d
79 (citations omitted).
Tf 45 Here, Mr. Montgomery was obligated to seek an in camera
review of Jessica's mental health records before searching through
them. Because he did not follow proper procedures in subpoenaing
the records or requesting an in camera review, we affirm the trial
courts conclusion that the subpoenas must be quashed.
State v. Gonzalez, 2005 UT 72, at paras 42-45 (footnotes omitted) (emphasis added).
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The underlined language above is extremely telling regarding the concept of
"element of his defense." One: the Court denied Gonzalez's request principally because
defense counsel obtained the records improperly. That is to say: it appears that the
Gonzalez Court really did not reach, in the substantive sense, whether Gonzalez had
made the requisite "element of his defense" showing. Indeed, the Court's header
regarding the above-quoted section speaks not to an "element of his defense," but reads:
"B. Failure to Turn over Records to Court for In Camera Review." And, toward that end,
the Gonzalez Court bounces back to the language in Cardall, which in turn uses the
Ritchie language, to establish the standards used to determine whether a litigant may
inspect a witness's mental health records.
B

THE MENTAL HEALTH RECORDS WERE PROPERLY SHOWN
TO BE EXCULPATORY
1.

Sufficient Outside Sources

The narrow question here is whether the alleged victim's own discussions, as well
as the documents drafted about her, which were conveyed to the officer assembling the
presentence report, constitute a sufficient outside source under State v. Blake, 2002 UT
113. Clearly they do.
On this topic, Blake reads:
Where a defendant's request for in camera review is accompanied by
specific facts justifying the review, a court will be much more likely
to find "with reasonable certainty that exculpatory evidence exists
which would be favorable to his defense." Id. at ^ 30. However,
when the request is a general one, such as the request in this case for
any impeachment material that might happen to be found in the
privileged records, a court ought not to grant in camera review. At a
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minimum, specific facts must be alleged. These might include
references to records of only certain counseling sessions, which are
alleged to be relevant, independent allegations made by others that a
victim has recanted, or extrinsic evidence of some disorder that
might lead to uncertainty regarding a victim's trustworthiness. This
listing is not intended to be exclusive, but is only an example of the
type and quality of proof needed to overcome the high Cardall
hurdle.
Blake, at para. 22 (emphasis added).
Here, and even putting aside the letters provided to the sentencing officer, none
other than the prosecutrix herself revealed facts, on the heels of trial, that her story at trial
could very well have been inaccurate. It is Mr. Wengreen's position that when the
alleged victim provides facts which make his / her trial story unlikely (as well as letters
provided to the presentence officer), the sufficient outside sources requirement in Blake
has been met.
3 It is Reasonably Certain that the Records Would Have been Exculpatory
The Blake Court discusses the various types of information which could properly
be seen as exculpatory: "This situation differs markedly from cases where a criminal
defendant can point to information from outside sources suggesting that a victim has
recanted or accused another of the crime alleged or has a history of mental illness
relevant to the victim's ability to accurately report on the assault." Blake, supra, at para.
21 (emphasis added).
Notwithstanding defense counsel's comment's at the quash hearing (which the
State frames as concessions), it is Mr. Wengreen's position that, under the "history of
mental illness" language in Blake, he has demonstrated that the mental health records
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contain, with reasonable certainty, exculpatory evidence. Specifically, it is highly
unlikely that the alleged victim in this case does not have a history of mental illness. It is
highly unlikely that her statements, post-trial, which were fantastic and contradictory,
simply popped up out of the blue. Her statements, post-trial, indicate an individual who
suffers from a mental disorder which affects her ability to relay facts accurately, and
which affects her ability to judge what did or did not happen between her and Mr.
Wengreen.

II
THE NEW TRIAL MOTION SHOULD HAVE BEEN GRANTED
The bottom line is whether there is, as the State essentially argues, a procedural
bar on granting a new trial when the alleged victim explains at trial that she was touched
only on the buttocks, but then, just after trial, reports contact of a much more serious
nature. There is of course no such bar in Utah's case law, and the new trial motion
should have been granted.
In State v. Pinder, 2005 UT 15, the State requested that the Supreme Court adopt a
very rigorous standard when discussing whether new trial motions should be granted. The
Pinder Court responded: "
The State would have us adopt the newly discovered evidence
test recently utilized in situations involving petitions for postconviction relief. See Wickham v. Galetka, 2002 UT 72,ffif9, 13, 61
P.3d 978; Julian v. State, 2002 UT 61,fflf15, 20, 52 P.3d 1168. In
Wickham and Julian, we applied the language of the PostConviction Remedies Act, which states that newly discovered
evidence does not warrant post-conviction relief if the new evidence
is "merely impeachment evidence." Utah Code Ann. § 78-35a104(e)(iii) (2002). Despite potentially misleading dicta to the

contrary, we have never held that "mere" impeachment evidence is
insufficient in all situations to justify the granting of a new trial in
the course of regular appellate review.
Therefore, we reaffirm that newly discovered impeachment
evidence can justify the granting of a new trial in certain situations.
See Montova, 2004 UT 5 at 1f 11, 84 P.3d 1183.
[22] [23] If 67 As a result, it is proper for the trial court, when
confronted with a motion for a new trial due to newly discovered
evidence, to consider the credibility of new witnesses as well as the
manner in which new evidence meshes or clashes with evidence
presented at trial. See id.
Pinder, supra, at n. 11 and para. 67 (emphasis added).
Even putting aside in the instant case the principle that the alleged victim's posttrial revelations speak to her ability to tell the truth (and they certainly do), there is no bar
- and there should be no bar here - to a situation where egregious impeachment evidence
is grounds for a new trial. Of course, Mr. Wengreen attached to his new trial motion a
trenchant discussion from a therapist regarding the victim's mental health, which
discussed her very ability to report even bare facts, but clearly the jury would have like to
have heard the victim's dramatic change in stories. It was first: he touched me on the
buttocks; then it was conduct of a much more severe nature. Which is it? There is
clearly a difference between the two stories, and this new evidence should get to the jury.
///
///
///
///
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CONCLUSION
Based on the foregoing, Mr. Wengreen's convictions should be reversed.
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this 9th day of March, 2007.
LAW OFFICES OF MARK MCBRIDE, PC.

Mark McBride
Attorney for Appellant
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